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Scholarly work on nuclear proliferation tends to relegate the atomic aspirations of the 
Shah to the role of a framing device for the nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. This approach is lacking, as it overlooks a large body of primary source material 
which portends to an alarming interest in, and potential movement towards nuclear 
weapons on the part of the Iranian ruler. This article will examine whether the Shah took 
any concrete steps towards developing nuclear weapons. In arguing that Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi did so, two arguments are made. Firstly, that the Shah’s nuclear energy 
programme, when completed, would have allowed for nuclear weapons to be developed. 
Secondly, there were multiple efforts by the Shah to procure weapon systems which are 
key in a functioning nuclear deterrent.  
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Introduction 
‘Certainly, and sooner than is believed, but contrary to India, we have first thought of our 
people, and then of our technology.’2  This was the response of the Shah when questioned 
about the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon following India’s 1974 nuclear 
test. While it was immediately walked back, this slip alluded to atomic ambitions that 
would fit comfortably within the broader aims of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who sought 
to dominate the Gulf, and assert regional influence. The validity of his response is 
buttressed by a number of high-ranking Iranian officials. Asadollah Alam, a key confident 
of the Iranian monarch believed that his ‘great vision for the future of this country ... 
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probably included [the] manufacturing of a nuclear deterrent.’3 The head of the Atomic 
Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), Akbar Etemad, believed that ‘if the shah had 
remained in power he would have developed nuclear weapons because now Pakistan, 
India and Israel all have them.’4 Hassan Toufanian, the Iranian Vice Minister of War, 
followed similar lines. He felt that while a nuclear weapon was not pursued now, ‘t[h]at 
did not mean we would not be interested in another decade.’5 The Shah’s closest aides all 
believed in nuclearisation at some point in the future. This raises a startling question; did 
the Pahlavi dynasty take any concrete steps towards procuring nuclear weapons? This is 
the question this paper seeks to address.  In doing so, this paper is divided into two parts; 
first, an exploration of the Shah’s vast civil nuclear programme, which upon completion 
could have provided the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Secondly, three alarming 
arms purchases that strongly relate to nuclear ambitions are also discussed. These concern 
efforts to procure nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles (the ‘Lance’, ‘SCUD’ and 
project ‘Flower’) and the intriguing possibility that the Shah sought to purchase 
submarines capable of carrying nuclear ballistic missiles.  
 
The Nuclear Energy Programme 
Iran’s nuclear energy programme could support nuclear weapons development. This was 
driven by the expanding scientific base of Iran, access to fissile material as well as the 
necessary information, and the processes of nuclear enrichment which the nuclear 
programme provided. The Shah announced his nuclear energy ambitions in March 1974, 
stating that ‘[w]e shall, as fast as we can, enter the age of using the atom and other sources 
of energy in order to save oil for production of chemical and petro-chemical products.’6 
This programme went through three phases, ‘a first, experimental stage, with the support 
of the [U.S.] and [U.K.]...(1957-1973)...a period of significant expansion…(1973-
76)...and finally, a relative lull in most nuclear activities (1977-78).’7 The Shah’s aim was 
to generate ‘...23,000 [Megawatt energy] of electricity with nuclear plants.’8 Context 
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demonstrates the scale: ‘23,000 MWe is about the entire amount of nuclear energy 
generated at present in Russia.’9 
 Iran’s scientific base began with scientists receiving their education abroad, with 
the sending of ‘some 300 students to West Germany, the United States, France and Britain 
for nuclear training...’10 There were also large numbers of foreign advisors from India, 
France, West Germany and the US. This ‘growth...stimulated the development of 
indigenous training and research facilities in various fields related to nuclear energy.’11 
This culminated in the ‘AEOI ... employ[ing] more than 4,500 scientists.’12 The AEOI 
also expanded its scientific base through hiring a number of notable consultants, such as 
Argentinian Naval Admiral Oscar Armando Quihillalt who ‘served for fifteen years as 
head of the Argentinian nuclear program[me].’13  
 The Iranian scientific base benefitted from the massive military and nuclear 
energy programmes undertaken. Iran grappled with developing technical competence 
across a wide range of modern weapon systems. The Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) in 
particular would have served to inculcate multiple generations of technicians, who could 
then translate their experiences dealing with advanced, precision equipment to nuclear 
technology. The Shah also sought co-production deals with the US to manufacture 
advanced weapon systems. Most obviously, the sheer scale of the Iranian nuclear energy 
programme would require significant numbers of nuclear technicians who could easily 
apply their knowledge to nuclear weapons.  
 With a viable scientific base, the next key stage is access to fissile material. Iran’s 
primary source of fissile material would be its civilian programme. US intelligence 
analysis reported that ‘the annual plutonium production from the planned 23,000 MW 
Iranian nuclear power program[me] will be equivalent to 600-700 warheads.’14 Similarly, 
U.S. congressional research indicated that ‘the Iranians could build a minimum of 200 
Hiroshima bombs a year.’15 These reports were predicated on Iran being able to reprocess 
spent nuclear fuel into fissile material. The prospect of Iran having complete control over 
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the nuclear fuel cycle was the subject of protracted U.S.-Iran negotiations from 1974 to 
1976. These ‘ultimately failed to produce an agreement.’16  
 There were two reasons for their failure; Iran could simply turn to European 
nuclear technology exporters like France and West Germany who would be ready to enter 
a deal with them without preconditions. West Germany had previously concluded a deal 
with Brazil that involved exporting spent fuel reprocessing technology. Secondly, ‘[t]he 
Iranians were simply unwilling to forgo the option of national reprocessing facilities’, 
with Etemad stating bluntly that ‘Iran considers reprocessing an important ‘downstream’ 
activity, and for obvious security of supply and economic reasons...intends to have it 
performed in...Iran.’17 Etemad and the AEOI ‘understood that it was their patriotic duty 
to develop the scientific knowhow for a nuclear weapons program[me].’18  
 In support of this, ‘Etemad quietly approved budget allocations for dual use 
projects, such as uranium enrichment…’19 Iran would establish multiple streams for the 
procurement of uranium. As part of the dealings with France and West Germany, Iran 
would receive uranium from the European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment 
Consortium (EURODIF). The AEOI also sought nuclear fuel from various African 
states,20 and concluded a ‘secret agreement with South Africa in October 1975 to purchase 
enriched uranium.’21 Seeing American efforts to impose restrictions as untenable, the 
Shah concluded a deal with France and West Germany. Iran ‘finalised an $8 billion deal 
to build a total of eight nuclear reactors’22 with France, and with West Germany to provide 
nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, which Kissinger fumed ‘will still look like 
Brazil’,23 referencing the controversial West German deal to supply Brazil with the full 
nuclear cycle.  
 
Alarming Arms Purchases 
The MGM-52 Lance was an American tactical ballistic missile, with a nuclear (optionally 
conventional) warhead and a range of up to 130 km. It was principally a nuclear weapon; 
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its conventional variant was only effective with a cluster munition warhead, owing to 
inaccuracy. It was mobile, being deployed via a transporter-erector launcher.24 In 1975, 
‘ARMISH/MAAG was...requested to provide information on the price and availability of 
3 to 6 battalions of LANCE.’25 This was rejected. The Shah then instructed Toufanian to 
‘ask...the USSR to provide surface-to-surface (probably SCUD) missiles.’ However, 
‘[t]he Soviets reportedly turned him down.’26 The SCUD was a Soviet analog to the 
Lance, with twice the range. As U.S. government analysis aptly notes, ‘the Shah’s 
willingness to approach the USSR...suggests he’s willing to pay a considerable political 
price’ for such a system.27 The attempted purchase of the Lance and SCUD missiles is an 
often-overlooked attempt at purchasing a key component of a viable nuclear deterrent.  
 The Shah’s stated need for the Lance or SCUD was spelled out in a meeting with 
U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) General Wilson, where ‘he emphasised his need 
for a weapons system capable of neutralising Iraqi SAM (Surface-to-Air Missiles) sites 
without risking the loss of large numbers of aircraft.’28  
 This reasoning is specious at best. At the time, the aerial doctrine of Suppression 
of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) had been developed in the Vietnam War, and was 
effective against a vast and intricate Soviet-designed air defence network. SEAD involved 
aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom (a key IIAF plane), which in its SEAD variant was held 
to be ‘the king of SEAD from Vietnam to the Gulf.’29 Consequently, Iran could not have 
needed the above mentioned missiles for SEAD, nor could they be considered adequate 
for the role in the first place. 
 U.S. memos warned that ‘[a]lthough we would be selling the conventional 
warhead, many Congressmen (and the press) would relate the sale to Iran’s nuclear 
development program[me].’30 The Lance’s range, and the technical issues relating to 
warhead miniaturisation would have prevented their immediate nuclear use. It is likely 
that the Shah desired them not for immediate use, but to reduce the technical barriers to 
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deploying and maintaining nuclear capable missiles.  The Shah also ‘expressed a strong 
interest in the manufacture of certain items of U.S. military hardware in 
Iran...specifically...the 2.75’’ air-to-ground rocket, the AGM-65A...air-to-ground missile, 
the TOW and DRAGON anti-tank missile systems.’31 While these were missiles which 
served vastly different purposes to the SCUD and the Lance, being able to manufacture 
them would lay the foundations for a missile programme which could — prospectively 
— support the independent production of Lance/SCUD level missiles.   
 While the Lance and SCUD affair showcased a desire for short-range ballistic 
missiles, the Joint Iranian-Israeli ‘Flower’ project demonstrated the importance the Shah 
placed on such a capability. This was a billion-dollar agreement with Israel where Iran 
would finance the programme, and Israel would produce the missile. The transaction was 
greatly assisted by large shipments of Iranian oil, being one of many arms-for-oil 
agreements between the two nations. Most damningly, the two went to great lengths to 
hide their efforts from the U.S., with Israel seeking to use only domestic parts to prevent 
a U.S. export veto, and Iran not informing the U.S. whatsoever. Both sides were aware of 
the significance of this, with Moshe Dayan reportedly stating that ‘at some stage, the 
problem will have to be raised with the Americans’ and that he would seek to discuss this 
with the Shah directly.32  
 The missile itself was significant, having a range of 480 km, and carrying a 
warhead weighing 750 kg. This, in the words of Dayan, meant that ‘the missile...can be 
regarded as a missile with a nuclear head, because with a head of 750 KG it can be a 
double-purpose one.’33 The missile also reached a late stage of development, with a 
successful test being carried out in Israel, which Toufanian observed, gushing that ‘it was 
a beautiful...fully developed missile.’34 Investigation into the subject reveals that 
following this, missiles were ‘to be shipped through a Swiss company to central Iran for 
assembly and testing.’35 While technical problems such as dealing with the missile relying 
on ‘American-made…[equipment]...that Israel was forbidden to [export]’36 were still to 
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be overcome, barring the Iranian revolution, the Shah would have come into possession 
of a short-range ballistic missile capability.  
 It can be argued that the efforts to acquire the Lance, SCUD and ‘Flower’ missiles 
was an attempt by the Shah to develop an initial operating capability of short-range 
ballistic missiles, and the technical ability to operate, and perhaps even manufacture, his 
own in the future. These could have served as a readily available short-range delivery 
system for nuclear weapons, and thus represented a concrete step towards developing 
them. The SCUD, and to a lesser extent the Lance, could target key Iraqi installations 
from within Iran. The ‘Flower’ project missile could carry more, farther. Having ready 
access to nuclear-capable missiles would prevent being denied access to them later, 
should the superpowers refuse to tolerate a nuclear Iran. Thus the lengths the Shah went 
to in order to acquire short-range ballistic missiles, which his strategic situation did not 
immediately necessitate at the time, indicates that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi sought 
ballistic missiles to make nuclear weapons more feasible.  
 More evidence that the Shah sought to purchase key weapon systems for a nuclear 
deterrent is an alleged attempt to purchase nuclear submarines from France. Documentary 
sources surrounding this are scarce, with the primary basis for this being a telephone 
conference transcript of a conversation between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 
and Pierre Brousalette, the Secretary General of the Office of the Presidency of France. 
This exchange has not been dealt with whatsoever in scholarship. In this short exchange, 
Brousalette outlines that France has been ‘under some pressure lately from Spain and 
Tehran...both would like us to buy in the future nuclear-powered submarines…[t]he 
people from Tehran have been hinting the U.S. might sell them in the future – the nuclear 
powered submarine.’37  
 Odd choice of word aside, it seems that Brousalette was alleging that Tehran 
wanted to purchase nuclear submarines from a trusted nuclear energy partner (France had 
built multiple Iranian nuclear reactors), and that the U.S. was already considering selling 
them submarines. Kissinger was seemingly irate, stating ‘[i]ts inconceivable and there’s 
no way a subordinate department can do this without me knowing about it.’38 Adding to 
the bizarre nature of this, is the fact that at this moment France only operated nuclear-
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powered ballistic missile submarines. France's first ballistic missile submarine, Le 
Redoutable was laid down in 1964 and commissioned in 1971. France’s first nuclear 
attack submarine was launched in 1983, a full eight years following this exchange. While 
this could be another attempt by the Shah to ‘co-finance’ another major weapons system, 
this is dubious at best, given the intense secrecy which surrounds nuclear submarines. 
Further, this being a French ploy cannot be ruled out either.  
 Interestingly, during the Project ‘Flower’ talks, Admiral Habibollahi of Iran 
mentions to Admiral Barkai of Israel in July 1978 ‘the possibility of enhancing the Flower 
project so that the missiles could be launched from submarines.’39 Habibollahi later 
explained that ‘we were considering tactical, nonnuclear missiles for our submarines.’40 
However this must be framed by the fact that Iran’s intended non-nuclear missile was not 
in any way limited from carrying a nuclear payload. While a nuclear submarine would be 
of little use in the Persian Gulf, a possible role for said submarine could be to provide a 
guaranteed second strike ability, taking advantage of Iran’s access to the Indian Ocean. 
While this would certainly be strongly indicative of an attempt to develop a nuclear 
deterrent, the lack of further documentary sources limit its reliability.  
 
Conclusion 
The spectre of a nuclear Imperial Iran occurring but for the Iranian revolution, as forecast 
by the Shah’s closest confidants, deserves much greater scholarly attention. The gap 
which this article has highlighted is symptomatic of issues within the broader literature 
on Iranian nuclear proliferation, where the atomic aspirations of the Shah are used only 
to frame those of his revolutionary successor. In pushing against this tendency, this paper 
has sought to engage with the prospect of whether the Shah had taken any steps towards 
procuring a nuclear deterrent. In doing so, this paper has advanced two arguments in 
support of the position that the Shah did indeed move towards nuclearisation. Firstly, that 
the scale of the Iranian nuclear energy programme would have allowed for Iran to 
manufacture nuclear weapons, largely unhindered. This was achieved through securing 
nuclear fuel supplies, forming a large scientific base, and a nuclear fuel processing chain, 
which would allow for the enrichment of uranium. Secondly, three arms purchases were 
examined, which indicate a strong desire on the part of the Shah to operate weapons 
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systems which would ultimately be of use in developing a nuclear deterrent. These were 
the Lance, the SCUD and the Project ‘Flower’ missiles. The article has also considered 
documentary evidence which points towards attempts to purchase nuclear submarines. 
Taken together, these display on the part of the Shah an interest in the ability to nuclearize, 
along with seeking arms purchases necessary to field a nuclear deterrent.  
